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 Chapter 4 
 Th e Principle of Autonomy in Kant’s 
Moral Th eory :  Its Rise and Fall 
 Pauline  Kleingeld 
 1   Introduction 
 Th e notion of autonomy is absolutely central to Kant’s moral theory in the 
 Groundwork and the  Critique of Practical Reason . Kant considers auton-
omy of the will to be the “supreme principle of morality” (G 4:440) and 
the “sole principle of all moral laws and the duties corresponding to them” 
(KpV 5:33). Kant presents the “Principle of Autonomy” (known in the lit-
erature as the “Formula of Autonomy”) as an especially apt version of the 
Categorical Imperative (G 4:431– 2), describing it as the “principle of each 
human will as a will that is legislating universally through all of its max-
ims” (G 4:432). Furthermore, he calls autonomy a “property” of the will (G 
4:440), namely the property of its being the source of the laws to which it 
is subject, independently of inclination or any other authority outside the 
will itself. Last but not least, he equates autonomy with freedom of the will 
(G 4:447). Clearly, the idea of autonomy is of crucial importance. 
 By the time we get to the  Metaphysics of Morals , however, ‘autonomy’ 
has virtually disappeared. In the Introduction, Kant does not mention it, 
let alone highlight it as the supreme principle of morality, even though this 
is where he lays out the basic concepts and presuppositions of the book. 
He reintroduces the Categorical Imperative, the notions of moral laws and 
duties, the idea of freedom, and many other core elements of his moral 
theory – but not autonomy. Indeed ‘autonomy’ occurs only twice in a 
moral context, each time without special emphasis and without reference 
to particular moral principles or freedom of the will (MS 6:383, 6:481). Th e 
Principle of Autonomy is not mentioned at all. 
 What happened? In the literature, there is no debate about the virtual 
disappearance of the notion of autonomy from  Th e Metaphysics of Morals , 
and Kant himself does not comment on the issue. Most authors seem to 
assume that he was still committed to his previous views but simply failed 
to mention it. Given the book’s stated aims, however, his failure to mention 
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this anywhere would be strange. Moreover, as I  show below, autonomy 
recedes into the background well before the  Metaphysics of Morals , and the 
Principle of Autonomy completely disappears. 
 If we wish to gain a better understanding of the curious fate of auton-
omy in Kant’s ethics, 1  a good place to start is in the  Groundwork where he 
fi rst presents the notion of autonomy. Th is is his discussion of the third 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the formulation that he terms 
the “Principle of Autonomy.” If it is possible to explain the rise and fall 
of this third formula, this may provide us with the key to explaining the 
virtual disappearance of ‘autonomy’ during the 1790s. 
 Th e thesis I shall be defending is that the Principle of Autonomy in the 
 Groundwork includes a legislation analogy, and that this analogy was apt 
given the political theory Kant defended at the time, but that it became 
obsolete in the 1790s, when he made important changes to his political 
theory. Around the time of the  Groundwork , Kant held that for state laws 
to be fully just, it is suffi  cient that they be genuinely universal; it is not 
necessary that the citizens actually consent to the laws. Th is made it pos-
sible for Kant to regard the criterion governing the moral permissibility 
of maxims as being fully analogous to the criterion governing the justice 
of political legislation. Th us, he could express the principle of morality 
as the requirement to act only on maxims that one can simultaneously 
regard oneself as  legislating universally . During the early 1790s, however, 
Kant dropped the view that genuine universality suffi  ces for the justice of 
state laws and added a second requirement, namely that the laws be given 
by the citizenry. He did not make a parallel change to his moral theory. 
As a result, I argue, the idea of “ legislating through one’s maxims” was no 
longer suitable as an analogy with which to express the moral principle. 
Th is explains why Kant no longer mentions the Principle of Autonomy. 
 In what follows, I fi rst discuss the legislation analogy as Kant presents it 
in the  Groundwork and the  Critique of Practical Reason . I examine Kant’s 
exposition of the idea of autonomy, emphasizing, among other things, that 
it involves legislation to all rational beings, including oneself – not legisla-
tion primarily “to oneself ” ( Section 2 ). I then explain the legislation anal-
ogy in further detail with reference to Kant’s 1784 political theory ( Section 
3 ). I next explain, in light of the changes Kant makes to his political theory 
  1   Karl Ameriks wrote a masterful book outlining the “fate of autonomy” after Kant in the works of 
 Reinhold,  Fichte, Hegel , and others. See Karl Ameriks,  Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in 
the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). I would 
like to suggest that there is also an interesting story to be told about the fate of autonomy in Kant’s 
own work – in particular, about its rise in the  Groundwork and its virtual disappearance from his 
moral theory in the 1790s. 
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in the 1790s, why the idea of autonomy no longer provides a fi tting anal-
ogy with which to express the principle of morality. I also consider what 
takes its place, namely the idea of a maxim’s  qualifying as a universal law 
( Section 4 ). In the fi nal section, I discuss the two passages in the Doctrine 
of Virtue in which Kant speaks of autonomy as a property of practical 
reason, in order to show that they fi t with the account provided in this 
chapter. I argue that neither passage refers to the Principle of Autonomy as 
a formulation of the Categorical Imperative ( Section 5 ). 2  
 2   Moral Autonomy As  a  Political Analogy 
 Th e notion of autonomy of the will, which Kant fi rst introduced in the 
 Groundwork , includes the following two core elements: the idea that the 
will is subject to moral laws, and the idea that the obligatory force of these 
laws originates in the will itself. If the will’s highest governing principles 
depended on an authority outside the will, this would be  heteronomy   – 
that is, the property of being subject to the legislation of another. Kant 
argues, however, that the will has the property of autonomy; it is subject 
to  its own legislation, legislation that is independent of inclinations (e.g., 
G 4:432– 3, 440). 3  
 Kant not only describes autonomy as a  property of the will but also formu-
lates the so- called “ Principle of Autonomy,” which he presents as one of the 
main formulas of the Categorical Imperative. 4  Here, the idea of autonomy 
serves to formulate a procedure for examining whether one’s maxims are 
morally permissible. Kant describes the Principle of Autonomy as the prin-
ciple of regarding one’s will as “a will that is universally legislating through all 
of its maxims” (G 4:431– 2). He describes it in more detail as the command
 to do no action on any other maxim than so that it could also coexist with it [viz., 
with the maxim] that it be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the will 
could regard itself as simultaneously giving universal law through its maxim.  (G 
4:434, cf. 440) 
 2   Another important issue in connection with the topic of this essay is the relation between the 
changes described here and the changes in Kant’s theory of freedom of the will. In the  Groundwork , 
Kant maintains that freedom of the will consists in autonomy, but he abandons this view – or at 
least changes it signifi cantly – with the introduction of the distinction between  Wille and  Willkür 
in the  Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6:213– 14, 226) . I defer discussion of this issue to another occasion, 
however, since it would require a chapter of its own. 
 3   Paul Guyer articulates a somewhat diff erent reading of autonomy, according to which it consists 
in the agent’s capacity to control his inclinations and act from duty. See Paul Guyer, “Kant on the 
Th eory and Practice of Autonomy,”  Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2003): 70– 98. 
 4   On the distinction between autonomy as a property and as a principle, see also Henry E. Allison, 
 Kant’s Th eory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 94– 106. 
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 Th us, in evaluating the moral permissibility of one’s maxims, one is to 
imagine one’s will as  legislating . One ought to conceive of one’s will as 
analogous to a political legislator who enacts state laws. Th is connection 
with political legislation is somewhat obscured by the fact that it is cus-
tomary to speak of ‘universal law’ in the context of Kant’s moral theory and 
of ‘general law’ in the context of his political theory, but the underlying 
German term is the same. 5  
 Kant presents the Principle of Autonomy as involving the use of an  anal-
ogy. 6  He does not argue that we  actually give universal laws through our 
maxims. Rather, he states explicitly that several versions of the Categorical 
Imperative, of which the Principle of Autonomy is one, each involve the 
use of “a certain analogy” (G 4:436, cf. 437) or a diff erent “way of repre-
senting” the Categorical Imperative (G 4:431, 436). Th e non- literal charac-
ter of the Principle of Autonomy is manifest in Kant’s repeated assertions 
that we are to “consider” or “regard” the will as simultaneously legislating 
through its maxims (see the passage quoted above, and G 4:431– 4, 438) or 
that we are to “act as if ” our maxims were to serve not merely as our indi-
vidual action principles but simultaneously as laws for all members of the 
moral community, or “realm of ends”: 7  
 [E] very rational being must act as if he were through his maxims at all times a 
lawgiving member of the universal realm of ends. Th e formal principle of these 
maxims is: Act as if your maxim were to serve at the same time as a universal law 
(of all rational beings).  (G 4:438) 
 5   In most cases, the German word ‘ allgemein ’ is best translated as ‘general,’ but in English translations 
of Kant’s moral theory it is usually rendered ‘universal’. Th is is because Kant distinguishes between 
‘ universelle ’ and ‘ generelle ’ rules (KpV 5:36, cf. also MS 6:216). Th e former rules hold always and 
necessarily, whereas the latter are merely correct on average and do not hold always and necessarily. 
‘ Generell  ’ is translated as ‘general,’ and ‘ allgemein ’ as ‘universal.’ Th is is not a mistake, and in this 
chapter I shall do the same. It does obscure the connection, however, between ‘general/ universal 
laws’ ( allgemeine Gesetze ) in morality and politics, since the laws of a state are usually called ‘general’ 
rather than ‘universal.’ Yet we are familiar with the use of ‘universal’ in some political contexts, for 
example in expressions such as ‘universal suff rage’ and ‘universal healthcare.’ 
 6   Th is has also been noted in the Kant literature, for example in Andrews Reath,  Agency and Autonomy 
in Kant’s Moral Th eory: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 4, and 
Jens Timmermann,  Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 110– 11. Nevertheless, the fact that Kant speaks of an analogy 
is still often overlooked in discussions of Kant’s notion of autonomy. I discuss Kant’s conception of 
analogy in more detail in my essay “Moral Autonomy As Political Analogy: Self- legislation in Kant’s 
 Groundwork and the  Feyerabend Lectures on Natural Law ,” in  Th e Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s 
Moral Th eory , ed. Stefano Bacin and Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
 7   For an overview of Kant’s use of these locutions, see Allen W.  Wood,  Kantian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 111. For a discussion of the importance of the 
simultaneity condition, see my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law,”  Kant- 
Studien 108 (1) (2017): 89– 115. 
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 Clearly, the Principle of Autonomy does not demand actual legislation in 
a literal sense but rather articulates a  counterfactual procedure as a method 
for assessing the moral permissibility of maxims. 
 Two further clarifi cations are in order. First, the procedure Kant articu-
lates does not require any actual or even imagined deliberation with oth-
ers. He always presents the procedure as one that can be carried out by 
the individual agent entirely in thought, and at no point does he require 
that we imagine deliberation among the members of the “realm of ends.” 8  
Th e criterion for the moral permissibility of a maxim, articulated in the 
Principle of Autonomy, is whether this maxim can simultaneously be a 
universal law (“that it could also coexist with it that it be a universal law,” 
G 4:434, quoted above). Although Kant mentions that we should take the 
perspective of all other rational beings into account (G 4:438), we satisfy 
this requirement simply by selecting maxims that can “serve at the same 
time as a universal law (of all rational beings)” (G 4:438). At no point in 
his discussion of the Principle of Autonomy does Kant claim that others’ 
actual attitudes toward our maxims must be taken into consideration. 
 Second, Kant does not speak of giving laws “to oneself,” not even ana-
logically. He consistently speaks of giving  universal law or of a law  of all 
rational beings . Th e set of all rational beings includes oneself, of course, but 
we misrepresent the scope of the imagined legislation – or at least represent 
it misleadingly – if we describe the Principle of Autonomy as requiring 
that one act as if one were legislating only or primarily  to oneself . 
 In current discussions, however, Kant is commonly read as saying just 
that: autonomy means that the will gives laws – or should “consider itself 
as” giving laws –  to itself . On this reading, the scope of the law is broad-
ened to other rational beings only mediately, via the idea that I give laws 
to myself  qua rational being, and hence implicitly to all rational agents. 
 Importantly, however, Kant puts it precisely the other way around. Th e 
Principle of Autonomy requires that I conceive of myself, counterfactually, 
as giving universal law through my maxims – as legislating  to all (including 
myself ). Th e scope and addressee of the imagined legislation is the entire 
moral community: “all rational beings” (G 4:438) or “everyone who has 
 8   In her article “Autonomy, Plurality and Public Reason,” in  New Essays on the History of Autonomy: A 
Collection Honoring J. B. Schneewind , ed. Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 181– 94, Onora O’Neill rightly emphasizes that Kant presupposes a plu-
rality of agents. He presents the idea of autonomy as the idea of the will “of  every rational being as a 
will giving universal laws,” and the Principle of Autonomy applies to a plurality of agents who ought 
to take the perspective of all others into account. Yet the moral imperative is addressed to each agent 
individually, and Kant assumes – as his  Groundwork examples attest – that one can assess the moral 
permissibility of maxims entirely by oneself. 
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reason and will” (KpV 5:36). It is helpful to remember that Kant is using a 
political analogy here. It would be a misrepresentation to say that the role 
of a political legislator is to give laws  to himself . Certainly, under the rule of 
law those who legislate are also subject to the laws they give, but legislators 
give laws  to all , including themselves; they don’t address the laws primarily 
 to themselves . 
 Th ere is of course a crucial element of refl exivity included in the idea of 
legislating to all, because universal laws are conceived as also applying to 
oneself. Kant emphasizes this by saying that the will is to be regarded as 
a legislating  member of the moral community and, as such, subject to its 
own legislation (G 4:433). Yet one would misdescribe the will’s imagined 
objective if one were to say that its aim is to give law to itself; its imagined 
objective, as Kant describes it, is to give universal laws – laws that apply to 
all rational beings. 
 In the whole of the  Groundwork , there does not seem to be a single 
passage in which Kant writes explicitly and unequivocally that autonomy 
of the will consists in the will  giving law to itself (except in translations, 
about which more below). 9  Rather, Kant speaks of considering the will as 
“giving  universal law” and of this being the will’s “ own legislation” (e.g., 
G 4:431– 2; KpV 5:33). Kant also speaks of the will’s “ being a law to itself ” 
(G 4:440, 447). None of these expressions is synonymous with “ giving 
law  to oneself  ” in the sense of the  primarily self- addressing act , on the part 
of the will, of  enacting legislation. 10  Instead, Kant describes the imagined 
objective as giving laws to the entire imagined community (of which one 
is a member). 
 Why do these clarifi cations matter? If there is an undeniable element 
of refl exivity in the notion of autonomy, insofar as one considers the will 
itself to be subject to the laws that it gives to all, then why is it so import-
ant to specify precisely to whom the law is given? Th e reason is that it 
has implications for the role of consent. If the will is viewed as legislating 
 to itself , its consent is implied. If, by contrast, the will is viewed as legis-
lating  to all rational beings  – which is what Kant writes – then this raises 
  9   Th e formulations that come closest are negative and concern heteronomy (G 4:444, KpV 5:33). 
  10   Th ere is one context in which Kant does explicitly use the refl exive expression in relation to laws, 
namely when he writes that reason gives laws to itself for thinking ( Gesetze […]  die sie sich selbst gibt , 
WDO 8:145). Indeed, if reason gives laws for thinking, it gives these laws to itself. But this does not 
in any way entail that the imagined universal legislation through our maxims, of which the Principle 
of Autonomy speaks, should also be conceived as legislation of the will “to itself,” and Kant does not 
use the expression in this context. 
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questions concerning their (imagined) consent. In the next section, I dis-
cuss Kant’s account of the role of consent in political legislation and show 
that this greatly illuminates his account of the Principle of Autonomy. 
 Before we move on to this topic, however, I must discuss one passage 
in more detail, as it is often thought to provide key evidence for the com-
mon interpretation. Th e impression that Kant claims that the will should 
be regarded as legislating  to itself is due, it seems, to one particular word in 
one particular passage. Th is is the passage in which Kant writes – using a 
German equivalent of the Greek- derived word ‘autonomy’ – that the will 
must be viewed as “self- legislating” ( selbstgesetzgebend ). 11  In English transla-
tions, “ selbstgesetzgebend  ” is often translated as “legislating to itself ” (e.g., 
Allen Wood 12  ) or as “giving the law to itself ” (e.g., Henry Allison, Mary 
Gregor 13  ). Since this is the only occurrence of this word in Kant’s published 
work, determining its meaning requires a closer look at the text. 
 In the passage at issue, Kant articulates the Principle of Autonomy in 
terms of the will’s  giving universal law , its being  subject to this universal 
legislation, and its being subject to this universal legislation  because it is 
itself its “author”:
 In accordance with this principle [viz., the Principle of Autonomy] all maxims are 
rejected that cannot coexist with the will’s own universal legislation. Th e will is 
thus not merely subject to the law but subject in such a way that it must also be 
viewed as  self- legislating [ selbstgesetzgebend ] and precisely for that reason subject 
to the law in the fi rst place (of which it can regard itself as author [ Urheber ]).  (G 
4:431, emphasis in original) 
 As a matter of translation, ‘self- legislating’ seems the best choice because it 
preserves the ambiguity of the German original. But what does the word 
mean here? 
 Th ere are at least four reasons for taking ‘self- legislating’ to indicate that 
the will is the  source of legislation (that is, legislation  by the will itself ). 
First, instead of “ selbstgesetzgebend   ” (one word), Kant also uses “ selbst 
gesetzgebend   ” (two words), which simply means ‘itself legislating.’ For 
  11   Th e Greek adjective  αὐτόνομος , which derives from the words for ‘self ’ and ‘law’, means ‘independ-
ent’ or ‘living under one’s own laws.’ 
  12   In his translation of the  Groundwork , in Immanuel Kant,  Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , 
ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
  13   In Henry E. Allison,  Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 240; Mary J. Gregor in the  Practical Philosophy volume of the  Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. In a footnote, however, Gregor mentions “itself lawgiving” 
as an alternative translation. 
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example, in the same context as the quoted passage, Kant describes the 
will as being “itself most highly legislating” ( selbst zuoberst gesetzgebend , 
G 4:432). Furthermore, he repeatedly calls this legislation the will’s “own 
( eigene ) legislation” (G 4:431– 2) and writes that it has “sprung from” the 
will (G 4:434). Th ese and many other related expressions emphasize the  self 
as the  source of legislation, whereas Kant does not write anywhere in the 
 Groundwork that the will “legislates to itself ” in the sense that the self is 
the primary addressee of the laws. 
 Second, many similarly constructed expressions also indicate the  source 
of a certain activity. Th e ‘auto’ in ‘automobile’ indicates that the vehicle 
is ‘self- moving’ in the sense that it moves by itself (as opposed to being 
moved by something else, such as a horse). An ‘autocrat’ rules by himself – 
and indeed, elsewhere Kant uses the adjective ‘ selbstherrschend   ’ or ‘self- 
ruling’ as the German equivalent of the Greek- derived ‘autocratic’ (MdS 
6:341). Here again the addition of ‘self ’ emphasizes that the activity at issue 
(ruling) is done  by the self , not that the self is the target of the activity. 
 Th ird, understanding ‘autonomy’ and ‘self- legislating’ in the sense of 
legislation  by oneself yields a very straightforward contrast with ‘heteron-
omy,’ which, after all, indicates that one is subject to laws given  by another 
(G 4:441). If autonomy is understood as legislation to oneself, this contrast 
is harder to construe. 
 Fourth, and relatedly, Kant in fact employs a  third term to refer to legis-
lation  to oneself , namely ‘heautonomy.’ He uses this term in the  Critique of 
Judgment to refer to the fact that the power of judgment “prescribes a law 
[…] to itself ” ( ihr selbst […]  ein Gesetz vorschreibt ) (KU 5:185– 6). Here we 
really do fi nd legislation  to oneself , and Kant calls it not ‘autonomy,’ but 
‘heautonomy.’ Tellingly, he distinguishes ‘heautonomy’ from ‘autonomy’ 
by saying that the ‘autonomy’ of the power of judgment would involve the 
latter’s prescribing a law  to nature ( ibid .). On the conception of autonomy 
as involving legislation  to oneself , this passage is incomprehensible. It fi ts 
well with the account I propose, however, since, in parallel fashion, auton-
omy as a property of practical reason consists in its prescribing laws  to all 
rational beings , and, similarly, the legislation analogy at the core of the 
Principle of Autonomy involves the idea of legislating  to all . In sum, the 
German adjective  selbstgesetzgebend in the passage at issue is not best read 
as meaning ‘legislating  to oneself.’ 
 Th e common reading of autonomy is perhaps also due, in part, to 
the widespread assumption that Kant’s conception of autonomy is best 
understood in terms of Rousseau’s theory of political freedom, accord-
ing to which freedom consists in living under the law one has prescribed 
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to oneself. 14  Many commentators view Kant’s theory of autonomy as the 
application of this idea to the moral realm. Th ey assume that Kant – in the 
mid 1780s –  agrees with Rousseau. Th is brings us to the issue of Kant’s posi-
tion on the proper role of citizens in legislation. Th e core of the Principle 
of Autonomy is an analogy with political legislation: the Principle requires 
us to consider our will as simultaneously giving universal laws through our 
maxims. As I have explained above, this raises a question about consent. If 
we are to conceive of ourselves as moral legislators, are we to conceive of 
ourselves as simply imposing our maxims on others without their consent? 
Where does their consent enter into the picture, if at all? To get a clearer 
sense of Kant’s conception of just legislation, we should examine the basis 
of the legislation analogy in Kant’s political theory. 15  As it turns out, this 
is also crucial for understanding why Kant later dropped the Principle of 
Autonomy. 
 3   The Basis  of the Legislation Analogy in 
Kant’s  Political Theory in 1784 
 Th e Criterion of Just Legislation 
 Th e most extensive source for Kant’s political theory around the time of 
the  Groundwork and the  Critique of Practical Reason is the set of student 
notes from his 1784 Lectures on Natural Law, known as the  Naturrecht 
Feyerabend . Kant taught this course over the very months in which he 
wrote the  Groundwork , which means that these lectures form a crucial 
resource for understanding the political analogies used in the latter. 
Moreover, the picture that emerges from the lecture notes is corroborated 
by published writings from the same year, such as Kant’s 1784 essay “What 
Is Enlightenment?” 
 Kant agrees with the common notion – itself an ancient idea  – that 
laws must be general (or ‘universal’) in scope and content. Regarding the 
criterion governing the  justice of a law, Kant’s position in 1784 is that a law 
  14   Jean- Jacques Rousseau,  Th e Social Contract , in  “Th e Social Contract” and Other Later Political 
Writings , ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1762]). 
  15   My focus in this chapter is the analogy’s basis in Kant’s political theory. I do not mean to imply that 
this is the only relevant background for a full understanding of the emergence of Kant’s account 
of autonomy. For example, developments in Kant’s conception of law as such, and his conception 
of the parallels between laws of nature and moral laws, certainly also played a crucial role. See 
Eric Watkins, “Autonomy and the Legislation of Laws in the  Prolegomena ,” in  Th e Emergence of 
Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Th eory , ed. Stefano Bacin and Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
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is just if it is  possible for the people as a whole to impose it upon itself. He 
writes as follows:
 Th e touchstone of whatever can be decided upon as law for a people lies in the 
question:  whether a people  could impose such a law upon itself.  (WiA 8:39, 
emphasis added) 
 In the  Naturrecht Feyerabend lectures, he similarly argues that state laws are 
just if they  could stem from the agreement of all:
 One must represent all laws in a civil society as given through the vote [ Stimmung ] 
of all. Th e original contract [ contractus originarius ] is an idea of the consent of all 
that has become a law for them. One must examine whether the law could have 
arisen from the agreement [ Uebereinstimmung ] of all: if so, then the law is right 
[ richtig ].  (NF 27:1382) 
 Importantly, Kant does not claim that just legislation requires citizens’ 
actual consent: for a law to be just, it suffi  ces that it “could have” arisen 
from general agreement or – in a slightly diff erent formulation – that it be 
given “as if from general agreement” (EzA, 19:346). In other words, a polit-
ical legislator can give laws that are fully just even if he does not have the 
actual consent of any subjects. Th e possibility of general consent suffi  ces. 
 On Kant’s view, the criterion of possibility – that is, the criterion gov-
erning  whether a people could impose a law upon itself – is that the law 
is indeed truly general, or, in other words, that it is a genuine law. By 
implication, all genuine laws are just. 16  If a law is a genuine law – if it does 
indeed meet the generality criterion  – then the people could give it to 
itself, and if the people could give it to itself, then the law is just. 
 To put it pointedly, this means that a law can be fully just even if it is 
laid down by a despot, if only the despot is enlightened enough to give 
laws that meet the criterion. Kant indeed reportedly claimed as much:
 Th e laws of a despot can be just, when they have been made such that they could 
have been made by the entire people. […]  It is not necessary for him to judge 
whether the people  would make such a law in this case, but whether it [viz., the 
people]  could have made such a law.  (NF 27:1382, emphasis added) 
 Th us, around the time that Kant wrote the  Groundwork , he argued that 
the justice of a law is entirely independent of whether the people who are 
subject to it would actually choose to adopt it when given the opportunity. 
  16   Rousseau draws a similar conclusion, although his argument for it diff ers, in Jean- Jacques Rousseau, 
 Th e Social Contract , 2.6. 
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 Th ere is a direct fi t between this criterion for the justice of political 
legislation and the  Groundwork ’s criterion for the moral permissibility of 
maxims. Th e Principle of Autonomy in its various formulations requires 
that one regard oneself as giving universal laws through one’s maxims. It 
requires one to act as if one’s maxims were at the same time to become 
laws for the entire moral community – that is, to act only on maxims that 
can simultaneously serve as universal laws. Kant can use the political crite-
rion as the basis for formulating a criterion for the moral permissibility of 
maxims since both in the political realm and in its moral analog the deci-
sive question concerns the required universality of the law. In neither the 
political realm nor its moral analog does the normative criterion require 
the actual consent of those who are subject to the law. 
 Th e Categorical Imperative as Constitution 
 All too often, authors assume that the law Kant describes as self- legislated 
is the Categorical Imperative. On closer inspection, however, it is clear 
that this cannot be correct. 17  For one thing, the Principle of Autonomy is 
itself a version of the Categorical Imperative. Furthermore, the Principle of 
Autonomy speaks of (as it were)  giving universal law through one’s maxims , 
or of considering the maxims of my will simultaneously as universal laws. 
Since the “universal law” mentioned in the Principle is the universalized 
version of my maxim, it cannot be the Categorical Imperative. 
 It helps greatly to keep in mind that Kant is using political analogies in 
his moral theory. I quoted Kant above as saying that states should be con-
ceived on the model of an “original contract,” by which he means that they 
should be conceived as having originated in the agreement of the subjects. 
Kant regards this idea as an a priori constitutional principle (NF 27:1382). 
He emphasizes that the idea of an original contract should not be misun-
derstood as a factual claim about the historical origin of states. Instead, it 
is a normative constitutional criterion for the justice of state legislation. At 
this stage of the development of his political theory, Kant regards the con-
stitution as an a priori idea of reason, not as a matter of actual legislation, 
let alone a matter of actual consent by the citizens (NF 27:1382). 
  17   Marcus Willaschek and I argue in defense of the thesis that Kant does not claim that the Moral 
Law or the Categorical Imperative is self- legislated, providing the necessary exegetical details 
in “Autonomy without Paradox:  Kant on Self- Legislation and the Moral Law” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2017). 
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 Th e role of the Categorical Imperative in moral legislation is paral-
lel, then, to that of the state  constitution . 18  Kant explicitly refers to the 
Categorical Imperative as the “constitutional law” ( Grundgesetz ) of pure 
practical reason (KpV 5:30) and as the “constitutional law” of an intelligi-
ble world (KpV 5:43). Just as the political constitution formulates a formal 
criterion for political legislation, the Principle of Autonomy – as one of 
the versions of the Categorical Imperative – articulates a formal criterion 
for the moral permissibility of one’s maxims. At the time of writing the 
 Groundwork , Kant regarded both the political constitutional law and the 
Categorical Imperative as a priori principles of reason. 
 4   Kant’s  Second Thoughts on Citizen Consent 
 Th e absence of ‘autonomy’ from the set of foundational concepts and prin-
ciples in the  Metaphysics of Morals does not seem to be a matter of debate 
in the Kant literature. In prominent recent volumes on the  Metaphysics of 
Morals 19  and on Kant’s conception of moral autonomy, 20  authors seem to 
proceed on the assumption that Kant is still committed to his previous 
theory of autonomy and simply fails to mention it. 
 Yet it is not at all evident that this assumption is correct. Th e number 
of occurrences of ‘autonomy’ drops off  dramatically following the publica-
tion of the  Critique of Judgment ; thus, in fact, it disappears from center 
stage well before the  Metaphysics of Morals. Th e term appears twenty- eight 
times in the  Groundwork , fourteen times in the second  Critique , and ten 
times in the  Critique of Judgment (mostly in connection with taste). After 
this point, the term occurs sporadically in its political sense, for example 
when Kant mentions the autonomy of states (ZeF 8:346) or the autonomy 
of the university (SF 7:17). Th e word does not occur in discussions of 
moral theory such as those in the  Religion and “On the Common Saying.” 
As mentioned above, the term appears twice in the Tugendlehre of the 
 Metaphysics of Morals  – about which more below – but  not to describe the 
“principle of morality” or the Principle of Autonomy. Th ese facts shift the 
burden of proof to those who assume that Kant is still fully committed to 
his earlier theory, including the Principle of Autonomy. 
  18   On this point, see also Andrews Reath,  Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Th eory , 109– 13. 
  19   See, for example,  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide , ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
 20   See, for example,  Kant on Moral Autonomy , ed. Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
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 It would be much more satisfying, however, to be able to  explain why 
the Principle disappears. To this end, I will sketch the relevant changes 
Kant made to his political theory (that is, to the basis of the legislation 
analogy) before showing how these changes explain why Kant dropped the 
Principle of Autonomy. 
 Changes to the Basis of the Analogy 
 During the 1790s, most notably in  Toward Perpetual Peace and the 
Doctrine of Right of the  Metaphysics of Morals , Kant introduces the nor-
mative requirement that citizens actually consent to legislation. He drops 
the thesis that it  suffi  ces that the people  could agree to a law and now adds 
the further requirement that the citizens also  do agree to it (through their 
elected representatives in parliament). Th is is a major change to his theory, 
since in the  Naturrecht Feyerabend he maintained that state laws do not 
require actual citizen consent in order to be just. I will not trace all the 
steps taken by Kant between 1784 and the 1797  Metaphysics of Morals , but 
I will highlight a number of important components of his later view for 
the sake of comparison. 21  
 In the Doctrine of Right of the  Metaphysics of Morals , Kant no longer 
holds that the laws of an enlightened despot can be fully just. He no longer 
regards it as suffi  cient that a law is truly general and  could be adopted by 
the people as a whole. He now regards this as a merely necessary condition, 
adding the further requirement that legislation must result from  actual 
consent by the citizens, via their elected representatives in parliament. Kant 
still attributes the status of an a priori normative principle to the “idea” of 
the “original contract” (MS 6:315), but he now adds that the “only consti-
tution that accords with right” is that of a “pure republic” (MS 6:340). By 
this he means a “ representative system of the people, in order to provide it 
with its rights, in its name, by all the state citizens united, by means of its 
delegates (deputies)” (MS 6:341). Th is ideal of the pure republic includes 
legislation by the citizenry, through their elected representatives. 
  21   Elsewhere I  discuss other aspects of Kant’s political theory that underwent related changes 
around the same time, such as Kant’s views on colonialism and the nature and approximate 
realization of an international federation. See Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Th oughts on 
Colonialism,” in  Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives , ed. Katrin Flikschuh 
and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 43– 67, and Pauline Kleingeld,  Kant and 
Cosmopolitanism: Th e Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
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 Kant writes that the legislative authority belongs to the united will of 
the people, that those members of a state who are “united for the pur-
pose of legislation” are called “citizens,” and that “the only qualifi cation for 
being a citizen is being fi t to vote” (MS 6:314). Kant infamously holds that 
fi tness to vote depends not only on being an adult but also on being eco-
nomically independent and male. He distinguishes between (propertied) 
“active” and (economically dependent) “passive” citizens, a distinction also 
found in the 1791 French constitution. He admits that this distinction 
seems to contradict his own account of citizenship and emphasizes that 
the law should leave it open to males to work their way up from passive to 
active citizenship (MS 6:314– 15), but he rules out this option in the case 
of women. 
 Active citizens have the right to vote and elect their representatives to 
the legislature. In this way, they have the right to consent to legislation, 
albeit indirectly, by being “represented by [their] deputies (in parliament)” 
(MS 6:319). 22  Th e freedom of the citizen, Kant writes, is the attribute of 
“obeying no other law than that to which he  has given his consent” (MS 
6:314, emphasis added). Th us, he now argues that right requires that the 
citizens  do consent (not individually but collectively, in parliament 23  ) to 
the laws to which they are subject. Citizenship comes with more rights, 
of course, than the mere right to vote – for example, Kant also writes that 
active citizens have the right “to manage the state itself as active members 
of it, to organize it or to cooperate for introducing certain laws” (MS 
6:315). 
 Kant is still committed to the view that there are a priori normative con-
straints on political legislation, because he still regards genuine universality 
as a formal normative requirement. Th us, compared with his position in 
1784, the crucial diff erence for the purposes of this chapter is the addition 
of the requirement that the laws be given by the (‘active’) citizens them-
selves, through their elected representatives. 
 Th e Obsolescence of the Legislation Analogy 
 As a result of these changes, Kant’s earlier analogy with political leg-
islation became  unsuitable as a formal model for assessing the moral 
 22   Th e reason why Kant regards representation as necessary is that it makes possible the separation of 
powers (MS 6:341, ZeF 8:352). 
  23   In practice, only a majority of votes is required, not unanimity; for Kant’s defense of this principle, 
see TP 8:296. 
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permissibility of maxims. Using the old analogy would have been awk-
ward. Kant came to  reject the idea that legislation can be fully just with-
out the actual consent of the citizens, and it would have been strange for 
him to articulate the principle of morality in terms of a political model 
he had discarded. 
 More importantly, the normative principles governing moral and politi-
cal legislation are no longer fully analogous. Th e criterion of genuine uni-
versality remains in place in both domains. But whereas Kant now adds a 
new criterion for just legislation in the political domain, namely that laws 
be adopted by the citizens themselves (via their elected representatives), he 
does not add a parallel requirement in the moral domain. He continues 
to hold that maxims are morally permissible if they can simultaneously 
hold as genuinely universal laws. As a result, the normative constraints on 
political legislation are no longer suitable for articulating the moral con-
straints on one’s maxims of action. 
 We can see this very clearly when we consider Kant’s descriptions of the 
principle of morality in the  Metaphysics of Morals . Here it is clear that he 
has not signifi cantly changed the substance of the moral requirement. Th is 
is how he articulates the Categorical Imperative: 
 Act on the basis of a maxim that can simultaneously hold as a universal law!  (MS 
6:225; cf. also 226) 
 According to this principle, it still suffi  ces that one’s maxim “can” simulta-
neously hold as universal law. Kant does not introduce an actual consent 
requirement into his moral theory. 
 Incidentally, in the  Religion Kant explicitly addresses the disanalogy 
between the political and the moral realms. He writes that in the case 
of a republic or “juridical commonwealth,” the people as a whole “is 
itself the legislator,” but he denies that this is true in the case of the 
“universal republic according to laws of virtue” or the “ethical common-
wealth.” In the moral republic, he writes, “the people as such cannot 
itself be regarded as legislating”; the legislator must be “someone other 
than the people,” namely God, who gives only “genuine duties” (Rel 
6:98– 9). Kant here seems to indicate that it is impossible to update the 
 Groundwork idea of the “realm of ends” in the form of a moral analog of 
his new political ideal of a republic in which the united citizens them-
selves legislate. 
 In sum, Kant’s political theory changed in a way that rendered the 
analogy with political legislation unsuitable. Th e old legislation analogy 
became obsolete. 
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 Qualifying As a Universal Law 
 Kant continued to use political analogies in his moral theory, of course, 
including the idea of the moral community as a “republic of virtue” or an 
“ethical commonwealth,” the idea of legislation as such, the idea of “rul-
ing” oneself, and many others. Th e fact that he abandoned the legislation 
analogy that had been the core of the Principle of Autonomy does not 
imply that he no longer regarded the political and moral realms as in any 
way analogous. It therefore makes sense to ask how, if at all, we might rede-
scribe the old analogy in terms of Kant’s new political philosophy. 
 At what point in the ideal political process, as Kant conceives it in the 
 Metaphysics of Morals , do citizens ask the question whether a principle  can 
hold as a general law? Kant still holds that political laws must be genuinely 
general. Th us, in his new political theory there is still a point at which the 
old question is raised. Th is is the moment at which citizens ask themselves 
whether a legislative proposal is a real  candidate for legislation – that is, 
whether a proposed law meets the formal requirement of being genuinely 
general. 
 Th e political counterpart of the question a moral agent should ask 
about any maxim he is considering, then, is the question a citizen should 
ask about any law he would like to propose. Th is is the question whether 
it  qualifi es for political legislation. If a law is directed at serving merely 
private interests, gives certain groups hereditary privileges, or lacks the 
required  generality in other ways, then it is exposed as a pseudo- law that 
fails to meet the formal requirements governing legislation (e.g., TP 
8:292– 3). 
 It turns out that this is exactly how Kant reformulates the procedure 
for testing the moral permissibility of one’s maxims. One should ask, he 
writes repeatedly, whether one’s maxim simultaneously “ qualifi es ” for gen-
eral legislation (MS 6:225– 6, 389, 393, 451, cf. 214). Kant still draws a paral-
lel with the political realm, but the focus of the moral procedure is now 
on the question whether one’s maxim  qualifi es as a universal law (while 
at the same time serving as one’s maxim). We also fi nd this terminology 
in Kant’s political writings, for example where he remarks, with regard to 
political laws, that “ inclination and, in general, what someone fi nds useful 
for his  private purpose simply does not qualify as a law” (SF 7:32). In other 
words, the moral imperative no longer directs agents to act as if they were 
 giving universal laws through their maxims; instead, it directs them to act 
on maxims that  could become universal laws (and simultaneously serve as 
their own maxims). 
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 It would be going too far to say that Kant here introduces an entirely new 
analogy. He does not elaborate the idea in any detail, perhaps because he 
wishes to avoid the suggestion that moral agents in the ethical community 
themselves legislate morally – the very suggestion he rejects in the  Religion. 
Moreover, the idea that one’s maxim should be “fi t” or “appropriate” 
( tauglich ,  schicklich ) for universal legislation is of course already implicit 
in the old legislation analogy in the  Groundwork (4:438, 441, 444) and the 
 Critique of Practical Reason (5:27– 8, 36, 74). In the  Metaphysics of Morals , 
however, it becomes the leading idea. 
 5   Autonomy in the  METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
 ‘Autonomy’ occurs twice in the Doctrine of Virtue, both times without 
special emphasis, but in each case Kant speaks affi  rmatively of the auton-
omy of practical reason. 24  Th e task that remains is to show how these two 
passages fi t with the narrative presented above. 
 Th e main argument of this chapter concerns the Principle of Autonomy, 
introduced in the  Groundwork but absent in the  Metaphysics of Morals . 
Neither of the two passages relates to the Principle of Autonomy as the 
formula of the Categorical Imperative that says that one ought to assess 
the moral permissibility of one’s maxims by regarding oneself as simultane-
ously legislating universally through one’s maxims. Instead, both passages 
concern autonomy as a  property , specifi cally practical reason’s property of 
being the source of moral laws independently of inclination. Kant is indeed 
still committed to the view that moral laws issue from reason itself. Hence, 
it is not surprising that he retains the idea of autonomy in this context. 
 Th e fi rst passage is found in the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. 
Kant writes:
 For fi nite  holy beings […] there is no doctrine of virtue but only a doctrine of 
morals, and the latter is an autonomy of practical reason, whereas the former also 
includes its  autocracy , which is a […] consciousness of the  capacity to master one’s 
inclinations that rebel against the law.  (MS 6:383) 
 Kant here calls a doctrine of morals “an autonomy of practical reason.” 
He distinguishes between a “doctrine of morals” and a “doctrine of vir-
tue,” saying that the former but not the latter is applicable to  holy rational 
beings. Such beings naturally do what morality requires and hence cannot 
 24   Th ere is a third occurrence of the term in the Doctrine of Right, where Kant refers to the autonomy 
of a state (MS 6:318). 
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be virtuous in the strict sense of the word. A doctrine of virtue does apply 
to humans, by contrast, because they are tempted to violate moral laws 
and need virtue in the sense of moral strength. Th is also means that a doc-
trine of virtue should include an account of how to master one’s inclina-
tions. Th e passage is not particularly easy to understand because the notion 
of “autocracy” remains somewhat ambiguous, but it is clear enough that 
the “autonomy of practical reason” refers to reason’s property of being the 
source of moral legislation, independently of inclination. It does not refer 
to the Principle of Autonomy. 
 Th e second passage in which ‘autonomy’ occurs is found in the Doctrine 
of Method, in a discussion of why the imitation of good examples cannot 
ground a maxim of duty. Kant’s answer is that a maxim of duty must be 
grounded in the “subjective autonomy of practical reason of each human 
being,” which he explicates by saying that “the law must serve us as an 
incentive” (MS 6:480). Here he states that the mere imitation of oth-
ers’ outward behavior does not qualify as acting from duty; to qualify as 
an action from duty an action must be done on the basis of a maxim 
adopted from respect for the law. So what Kant seems to mean by “subjec-
tive autonomy” is a property of each agent’s practical reason: namely, that 
it is the source of normative principles that provide incentives for moral 
action, independently of inclination. Again, this passage does not refer to 
the Principle of Autonomy. 
 In both passages, Kant seems to be claiming that practical reason has 
autonomy in the sense that it is the source of the (moral) laws to which 
rational beings are subject. From the  Groundwork through the  Metaphysics 
of Morals , Kant remains committed to this claim. Th e fact that Kant 
continues to use ‘autonomy’ in this context, even after he abandons the 
Principle of Autonomy, is neither strange nor problematic in light of the 
account provided above. 
 6   Conclusion 
 Around the time of the  Groundwork and the  Critique of Practical Reason , 
Kant claimed that genuine universality is a suffi  cient condition for a politi-
cal law being just (regardless of whether the subjects would actually choose 
to adopt it if given the opportunity). During this period he regarded the 
criterion for the moral permissibility of maxims as fully analogous to the 
criterion for the justice of political laws. Accordingly, he formulated the 
Principle of Autonomy as requiring one to act as if, through one’s max-
ims, one were simultaneously giving universal laws to the entire moral 
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community. During the 1790s, however, Kant changed his position on the 
criterion for just political legislation, adding the further condition that the 
citizens actually consent to the laws. As a result, the normative criterion for 
just political legislation could no longer serve as the basis for an analogy 
with which to express the principle of morality. Th is explains why Kant 
dropped the Principle of Autonomy. 25  
  25   I am grateful to Eric Watkins, Monique Hulshof, Carolyn Benson, Katharina Bauer, and Ken 
Westphal for helpful comments. 
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